According to Gans & Stern (1999), firms engage in R&D spending, in part, in order to improve their bargaining position as buyers in the market for technology. We test this theory empirically with data from the pharmaceutical industry. We develop and estimate a structural model of R&D spending and licensing. We find that R&D spending does improve the bargaining position of licensees; although, the effect is small. In the absence of the bargaining power effect, spending on R&D would be about 6% lower than it is. We also find that entry of technology licensors reduces firms' own R&D but has a positive overall effect on innovation.
Introduction
Technology licensing has been increasing in recent years in high-tech industries such as biopharmaceuticals, chemicals, semiconductors, and software. This may be a part of a larger growth in markets for technologies (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001 ).
Technology licensing is often seen as a substitute for in-house R&D. For instance, in R&D racing models, once a firm wins the innovation race, other firms terminate their in-house R&D and license the innovation. Competitors substitute licenses for their in-house R&D projects (Gallini and Winter, 1985 , Shapiro, 1985 and Katz and Shapiro, 1987 .
However, in markets for technologies, better informed buyers may fare better. In this regards, one set of studies find that in-house R&D complements licensing by enhancing the ability to utilize technological opportunities and also allows firms to be more selective and to focus on more valuable external sources of technologies (Arora and Gambardella, 1994 , Rosenberg, 1990 , and Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 . Gans & Stern (1999) propose a different relationship between R&D and technology licensing:
in-house R&D lowers the price of licensed technology by increasing the licensees' bargaining power. In their model, in-house R&D is eventually a substitute for licensed technology.
However, R&D investment increases the likelihood of the potential licensee being able to develop the innovation on its own, and hence improves the licensee's bargaining position, thereby reducing the price of the licensed technology. This gives in-house R&D and licensing some of the characteristics of complements. Both views on firms' in-house R&D suggest that buyers in the market for technology are likely to need significant in-house technical capabilities.
This raises the question of whether on balance increases in external supply of technology increase or decrease in-house R&D.
In this paper, we empirically test whether a buyer's in-house R&D increases a buyer's bargaining power. In particular, we develop a structural model for a firm's in-house R&D and licensing decisions which allow for competition among the technology suppliers and buyers, and for the buyer's investment in R&D to affect the price of a license. Using the model, we test the contention that R&D improves bargaining position, estimate the average price of a license, and perform several policy simulations.
The Model

Firm-level Structural Model
To test whether in-house R&D increases bargaining power, we develop a model in which a firm decides its optimal level of in-house R&D and the number of licenses to take. For our purposes, licensing involves compounds for new drug development, and the price of technology is a licensing fee. We assume that the licensing fee is a flat payment. 2 We assume that the licensing fee depends upon the alternative options the licensee has. One important option is to "go it alone" or rely on in-house technology alone. Thus, according to Gans & Stern (1999) , a firm with greater in-house R&D investment will be able to negotiate a lower licensing fee, because it has a more credible threat to "go it alone."
In addition to in-house R&D, a technology buyer's options also depend on whether there are other technology suppliers and other buyers. Perhaps a greater number of technology suppliers confer greater bargaining power on the buyer. Thus, the price of a license may be a function of the effective number of technology suppliers. Also, if there are more technology buyers in the market, the price of a license is likely to increase, reflecting greater competition among technology buyers.
Pharmaceutical firms must coordinate their R&D projects with investment in other durable inputs such as an appropriately sized, skilled and educated sales force and manufacturing capabilities. Firms invest in these assets in part in anticipation of the (stochastic) outcome of their R&D projects. Thus, as nature reveals to the firm which of its R&D projects have been successful, an imbalance may develop between the number of drugs a firm can develop and market, and the number of successful R&D projects. Simply put, pharmaceutical firms have sizable marketing and manufacturing capabilities which cannot be easily changed in the short run.
If the firm's R&D hits a dry patch, these capabilities will be under-utilized unless the firm licenses in some compounds to develop and market. Thus, licensing can be one way to balance the inevitable ebbs and flows of the R&D process and maintain a steady product pipeline.
Thus, it is reasonable to model a firm making its licensing decisions after the success or failures of its in-house projects become known. A firm's decision process is in Figure 1. [ Figure 1 ] A firm's decision process At the start of period 1, the firm is endowed with a stock (O) of on-going projects. During period 1, the firm spends R dollars on R&D and this results in an addition of Q units to the stock of projects. Then, between period 1 and 2, a stochastic quantity, F, of project stock decays ("fails"). Finally, in period 2, the firm buys L unit of project flow on the licensing market.
Thus, at the end of period 2, the firm owns
units of project stock. The payoff from this stock is:
Here, γ and are parameters of the firm's payoff function, and k a τ is the price of a license.
The total number of effective projects is represents firm-specific factors conditioning the value of effective number of projects: lnS (Sales) for firm size; US and EU for geographical location.
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The total number of effective projects (
is the sum of successful projects (Q), ongoing projects (O), and newly licensed projects (L), and minus the failed projects (F). All projects (Q, O, F, and L) are denominated in "efficiency approval units," reporting the expected number of approved drugs they represent (see section 3 for details).
The flow of projects form R&D spending in period 1 is generated via a production function:
The number of projects entering further phases, which we call successful projects (Q), is assumed to be a function of in-house R&D (R), the number of on-going projects in the beginning (O) and other exogenous factors, such as stock of knowledge (K), and technological opportunities (N). We assume that the number of successful projects (Q) follows Cobb-Douglaslike functional form, which can be written as a logged-linear format in equation (2) Moreover, we modeled the number of project failures (F) to be a function of the number of ongoing projects in the beginning (O), arguing that the number of on-going projects are not yet determined to be successful or not.
Project failure:
Note that the model has the following error structure: R ε : Random component for R&D capability of a firm. A firm observes this but econometrician does not, as a firm knows its R&D capability. This assumption allows us to use actual value Q in the R-equation for period 1. 
Choosing the number of technology licenses
In period 2, the firm chooses the optimal number of projects it licenses: In period 2, the first order conditions (FOC) for the optimal number of licenses is:
Solving this equation respect to L yields: 
In equation (3)", L is the optimal number of licenses a firm takes. L is affected by the price of licenses (through R, T and C), the value of R&D projects to the firm (through S, US, and EU), and successful, ongoing and failed in-house projects (Q, O, and F) .
Choosing the in-house R&D investment
In period 1, the firm chooses the level of in-house R&D (R) that maximizes the expected value: 
Equation ( 
System to estimate
Licensing equation:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------(4)"
Project Failures :
--------------------------------------------------------------------------(5)
The system above is non-linear in the parameters, but almost linear in the variables.
Data
The sample is an unbalanced panel with 294 observations on the top 49 pharmaceutical companies in the U.S. pharmaceutical market, selected by pharmaceutical sales from 1991 to 1997. As the unit of analysis is a firm, all the variables are constructed for firm i in year j. Our sample is drawn from the Pharmaceutical Industry Database (PHID) built at the University of Siena. PHID combines several sector-specific proprietary datasets about R&D activity, collaboration and final drug markets with data from public sources as well as companies' confidential information and press releases (Arora et al., 2000) . R&D spending and patent data are collected from COMPUSTAT and USPTO, and patent citation information is based on data provided by B. Hall, A. Jaffe, and M. Tratjenberg (NBER, 2002 Developers is not just a pure licensing contract.
3) Therapeutic Categories: Projects have been classified according to their targets in terms of likely therapeutic markets. We adopted the ATC (Anatomic Therapeutic Classification) at the 3 rd digit level 6 .
4) Development History:
The development history of each project is recorded, starting form the patenting date of the compound (priority and issue), through preclinical and clinical development stages (I, II, III), to registration and final launch on the market. For unsuccessful projects it registered the stage in which they have been discontinued.
5) Collaborations and licensing activity:
For the licensed compounds, the development stages (clinical phase I, II, or III) at which the collaboration agreement was signed and the type of collaboration that was specified by the parties is recorded.
4 Subsidiaries, divisions and research laboratories of pharmaceutical firms are included. For each project of these subunits our database reports the ultimate parent company. 5 We defined biotech companies to be all the companies in our database that were founded after 1976 (the year in which the first biotech company, Genentech, was founded) and that were originators of projects in the database that applied biotechnological methodologies to the discovery and development of new drugs. . 6 The Anatomical Classification of Pharmaceutical Products has been developed and maintained by the European Pharmaceutical Marketing Research Association (EphMRA) starting from 1971. A Classification Committee has been constituted to take care for new entries, changes and improvements. The 1 st level of the Anatomic Therapeutic Classification indicates the anatomical main group (C -Cardiovascular System). The 2 nd level identifies the main therapeutic groups (C1 -Cardiac Therapy). Finally, the 3 rd level separates out the pharmacological/therapeutic subgroups (C1B -Anti-Arrhythmics). The 3 rd ATC level is a widely accepted standard (applied for instance by Antitrust authorities around the world) to classify products for purposes of identifying the manufacturing market in pharmaceuticals.
6) Country of clinical trials:
PHID also reports the countries in which the clinical trials were conducted, and for the successful projects those in which the products were approved. As we shall see below, we only look at the trials conducted in the US.
For the purposes of this paper we extracted a specific sample from PHID. First, we disregarded all the projects that had not yet reached the clinical trials. Firms may differ in their definition of an in-house project, and they may have different attitudes about releasing news about their internal R&D activities. By contrasts, when they enter the clinical trials, the information about projects is registered and becomes public domain. This also entails a fairly standard definition of what constitutes a drug R&D project. Second, our sample is composed of all the projects that were terminated. These are all the projects in the database for which we know that the compound was either successfully approved for marketing, or it was discontinued at clinical phase I, II, or III. Third, we restricted our sample to the projects whose trials were conducted in the US. Finally, we also excluded all the projects licensed by the established pharmaceutical companies to other companies. Therefore, all the licensed compounds in our sample come either from universities or from NBFs.
R&D (R)
is measured by the annual R&D expenditure reported by the firms in millions of dollars. We use the one year lagged R&D in order to reflect the first period of a firm's decision making. However, we recognize the limitation in using firm-level R&D measure for testing the hypothesis of R&D increasing bargaining power. If a firm operates and conducts in-house R&D in more than one therapeutic area, using this measure assumes that there are spillovers among these therapeutic areas. In other words, using aggregate R&D measure assumes that $1 million of R&D in a given therapeutic area will lower license prices for all therapeutic areas. However, it is possible that there are fewer spillovers across therapeutic areas, but more within each therapeutic area. If this is true, the ideal way to deal with this problem is to find out a firm's R&D spending by ATC 7 , or a naive way is to simply divide R&D by the number of ATCs in which a firm is doing R&D. However, this R&D per ATC measure assumes that there are no 7 ATC stands for Anatomical Therapeutic Classification code, which is developed by the European Pharmaceutical Research Association.(www.ephmra.org) This classification code is now used by the World Health Organization (WHO) to classify pharmaceutical product or compounds. Although US has a slightly different code system, 3 rd level ATC codes are used in this paper, as they are applied to all pharmaceutical products in the world.
spillovers between therapeutic areas, and this assumption is debatable, as modern research for drug discovery depends on the integrated and accumulated knowledge of multiple scientific disciplines (Henderson and Cockburn, 1993) .
Also, there is a limitation in using a firm level aggregate R&D measure, regarding the unique R&D process in the pharmaceutical industry. It is possible that the bargaining power effect of in-house R&D is greater for drug discovery R&D spending rather than it is for drug development spending. The ideal measure to test whether in-house R&D increases bargaining power may be the amount of R&D spending for drug discovery research. However, this research measure is not publicly reported, nor it is easily obtained.
The total number of effective projects (Q+O-F+L) is constructed by the projects weighted by the probability of being approved conditional on entering a certain phase. Based on the study by Myers and Howe (1997) , we constructed the probability of a drug being approved when entering a phase in table 1. The number of effective successful projects (Q) is the projects newly entering the preclinical phase and advancing to higher phases weighted by the conditional probability of approval. For example, suppose company A had 10 on-going projects in the beginning: 5 projects in preclinical phase, 3 projects in clinical phase I, and 2 projects in clinical phase II. Of those projects, 2 projects in preclinical phase go up to phase I, 1 project in phase 1 goes up to phase II, and 1 project in phase 2 goes up to phase III. Based on the probability of a drug being approved in 
, where α k is the number of licensors in ATC k, and S ijk is the ratio of firm i's sales in year j at ATC k. One issue is that it seems unrealistic to treat a firm to be a technology supplier just for the year it is reported as a licensor. Hence, we assume that a firm is also a technology supplier in the adjacent years in which it did not actually license its technology. This notion is confirmed by the data set. There are firms licensing in one year and licensing again in the same ATC after a 2-3 year hiatus. Therefore, we treated a firm as Stock of knowledge (K) is traditionally considered an important input to innovation. Knowledge in the pharmaceutical industry is quite complex and multidimensional, and it is not unusual to argue that previous efforts to accumulate relevant knowledge will have a positive affect on product development. Although knowledge is intangible and difficult to measure, numerous authors have used a count of patents or patents weighted by citation information (Jaffe, 1986) , or accumulation of previous R&D expenditure (Grilliches, 1986) .
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We use the lagged number of patents weighted by forward citation information is used as a proxy for the 'Stock of knowledge (K)' Patents granted in the past five years were used to measure the stock of knowledge. Also, forward citations within 5 years are used to weight the value of the patents for each firm. To construct this measure of patents weighted by forward citation, we first, for firm i's patent k in year j, sum up the number of forward citations after scaling for the overall increase of patents granted as the following:
, where C ijk is the number of times firm i's patent k being cited in year j, and S i is the ratio of all granted patents in year j in year 1986. Next, we sum up those patents for firm i who was the assignee for those patents.
One measurement issue is about the missing forward citation information for patents issued after 1994. For an example, for the patent granted in 1995, we do not have citation information in 2000, which is five years after the patent being granted. Therefore, we made a simple estimate for the patents that we were unable to get citation information due to the time window we chose for our analysis. To deal with this problem, we imputed a five-year-period window for a patent citations using the information from 1991 to 1996. Thus, the number of citations a patent issued in 1995 gets in the year 2000 is the average of number of citations a patent issued in 1991 gets in 1996. Note that self-citation is excluded by dropping the citations by the same assignee.
Number of NIH (National Institutes for Health) research grants (N)
is used as a proxy for technological opportunities. As the purpose of the NIH research grant is to fund research that is conceivably important in terms of public health, the NIH selects specific research proposals in 9 Cohen and Levin observe that patents have been most frequently used as a measure for the output of innovation, despite problems affecting both within-industry as well as between-industry comparison. See "Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure" in Schmalensee and Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, pp. 1062-1066 (Section on measurement) for more in-depth discussion.
the field which it considers important. Gambardella (1990 and found that pharmaceutical firms try to expose themselves to new findings and technologies through various channels. Hence, knowledge generated and accumulated from NIH research may capture one aspect of a firm's technological opportunities.
To our knowledge, we are the first to measure technological opportunities by NIH research grants. NIH research grants (N) are measured by the average spending of federal research funds by therapeutic area. These research projects are retrieved from the Computer Retrieval of Information on Scientific Projects (CRISP) which is a searchable database deployed by NIH in 1998. 10 The variable is constructed in the following steps: first, projects are classified and counted by 2 nd ATC level and institutes (e.g. National Cancer Institute, etc) for each year (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) by searching the research database with the keywords of the ATC description; second, those projects are weighted by the average grant spending by each institute for each year; third, those average dollar value of research funds are weighted by the sales of the firm in that ATC.
Annual pharmaceutical sales (lnS) is another factor used to condition the effect of firm size on the firm performance. Larger firms may have more projects in their pipelines, or larger marketing forces that induce different levels of bargaining power. In this paper, a lagged 3 year moving average of annual sales (lnS) is constructed as a proxy for firm size. 'Sales' is measured by total annual pharmaceutical sales reported by each firm. Empirical studies in R&D, sales have been used to measure the firm size, despite the problem that sales measuring the endogenous interactions of demand and supply conditions (Cohen, 1996 Descriptive statistics are shown in Table which adds one to all the variables. By doing the analysis this way (rather than the more conventional method of adding one only to the relevant variables), our structural model remains coherent, we produce consistent estimates of our parameters, and we construct the correct elasticity (which obviously cannot just be read off of the parameter estimates). We performed a sensitivity analysis on the amount added in the functional form, varying it down to 0.05, and we observed no important effect on the results.
Estimation Results
We estimate 4 equations. The dependent variables are: 1) R&D investment by a firm i in year j (R); 2) The number of licenses taken by a firm (L); 3) The number of projects entering further phases (Q); 4) The number of failed projects (F).
Estimation and Identification Issues
An instrumental variable method of estimation is used to account for the endogeneity of some of the right hand side variables. A desirable estimation method is the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM). The key advantage of GMM is that it corrects heteroscedasticity problem, and potentially serial correlation. Note that there are several kernels developed to estimate consistent covariance matrices, and in this paper, we use the Parzen kernel.
The four equations are estimated simultaneously with cross equation restrictions by GMM.
However, note that we are not using full fixed effects due to the limited sample size. In the sample, we have at most seven observations per firm. Out of concern over degrees of freedom, we omit the 49 firm dummies from our analysis, but we do include seven year dummies (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) ).
In Table 3 contains estimates from the GMM estimation of equations (2), (3)", (4)" and (5). 
Estimation results and discussion
Impact of in-house R&D, technology suppliers, and buyers on the price of a license
The empirical results in table 4 supports that a buyer's in-house R&D increases bargaining power, as the price of license is negatively related to buyer's in-house R&D ( b , p-value < 0.001). Based on this estimate, $10 million of R&D lowers the price of a license by 2.7%, around $180,000.
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The price of a license is negatively associated with the number of technology suppliers ( b , p-value < 0.001). This means that one more technology supplier lowers the price of a license by 6%, which is around $820,000. The effect of having one more technology supplier on the price of license is equivalent to $88 million increase in the buyer's in-house R&D. The average price of a license is calculated as (
The average estimated value of this expression is $14.4 million. This compares quite well to the $13 million average technology licensing fee estimated from the SDC data files for the chemical industry.
The average number of licenses per firm is 2.3, so average annual expenditure on licensing estimated from our model is about $33.2 million.
The price function (τ) can be interpreted in a different way. If we interpret τ as a cost of assimilating external sources, the empirical results imply that in-house R&D reduces the cost of assimilating external sources. This means that it may be a firm's absorptive capacity that is being estimated with this model. One way to model absorptive capacity may be estimating how in-house R&D conditions the value of licenses. For example, the basic idea of absorptive capacity is that the value of additional licensing increases as a firm does more in-house R&D
). Thus, this notion can be incorporated in a simple payoff function, such as
, where
. Thus, one cannot distinguish between absorptive capacity and bargaining power in this specification.
The elasticity of an effective project w.r.t. R&D
The empirical results in Table 3 indicate that in-house R&D (R) has a positive effect on in-house projects entering further phases of drug development (Q) ( 37 .
, and p-value < 0.000).
The elasticity of in-house projects entering further phases (Q) with respect to a firm's in-house R&D (R) can be calculated using the estimated result, which is in the logged production function. Remember that we added 1 to all the variables in the success function. Hence, the coefficient of R&D, which is 0. Arora, Ceccagnoli and Cohen (2002) found that elasticity of R&D is 0.53 in Drug and Chemical industry (SIC 28), and Henderson and Cockburn (1993) estimate the elasticity to be 0.4 by using 'important patents' as a measure for pharmaceutical output, and Grabowski and Vernon (1978) estimate the elasticity of New Chemical Entities per dollar R&D input to be 0.4 in UK and 0.23 in the US between 1960 -1961 . Moreover, Gambardella (1995 estimates the elasticity of R&D to be 0.46.
In summary, our estimate stands within the range of the estimates of previous studies. Note that our measure, project successes (Q), includes the number of new projects and projects that pass certain phases, which is a broader and more complex definition than what has been used in previous studies.
The effect of government research and the stock of knowledge
The effect of the stock of knowledge and the technological opportunities on the successful projects are represented by and , respectively. NIH research grants are used as a proxy for technological opportunities for firms. The effect of NIH research grants on the successful projects is positive, and significant (
, p-value < 0.000). This measure of technological opportunities covers all therapeutic areas which NIH funds. Hence, it is reasonable to think that NIH tries to fund important areas from a public policy perspective, and pharmaceutical firms benefit from research that can be too risky for private companies.
The number of patents weighted by citation is a proxy for the stock of knowledge. It has negative impact on in-house projects, but weakly significant ( 
The effect of firm characteristics
The effects of firm size and geographical factors are measured by , , and , which are used to condition the value of effective projects. In Table 3 , annual sales (lnS) has a negative effect on the value of effective projects ( 
The change in R&D with respect to technology suppliers
We also analyze the effect of an increase in the number of technology suppliers on R&D and innovation. In our estimated model, a firm reduces its in-house R&D by 17.6% on average in response to the entry of an additional technology supplier. Meanwhile, in the world where R&D doesn't increase bargaining power, the firm would reduce its R&D by 19.5% on average in response to the entry of an additional supplier.
Were in-house R&D not to increase bargaining power, the firm would reduce its in-house R&D when the number of technology suppliers increases. Conceptually, a firm substitutes licenses for in-house R&D. However, in a world where in-house R&D increases bargaining power, a firm faces two opposite incentives for conducting in-house R&D. On the one hand, a firm has an incentive to reduce in-house R&D to substitute for licensing. On the other hand, a firm has an incentive to increase its in-house R&D to enhance bargaining power, which may allow a firm to license the compound at a lower price. Therefore, the R&D decrease in response to an increase in technology suppliers is muted by bargaining power consideration.
Furthermore, imagine a situation in which the number of technology suppliers decreases by half. Based on our model, when the number of technology suppliers decreases by half, the number of licenses taken by a firm (L) decreases from 2.3 to 0 on average, but in-house R&D increases on average by about 22.7%, which increases successful project (Q) by 0.7 on average. As a result, the total number of projects decreases. This simulated result implies that the policies or regulations restricting the trade of drug technologies can result in the decrease of actual drugs in the market.
Marginal value of effective projects
The marginal value of effective number of projects can be calculated for each firm as the following: Considering the definition of project success (Q) in our model, marginal value of an effective project should be interpreted as a marginal value generated by taking a project all the way through the development process to drug introduction. Grabowski and Vernon (1994) estimate the mean of Net Present Value (NPV) of a new drug introduction to be $22 million (1990 dollars). It is difficult directly to compare this NPV estimate with our marginal value, because the NPV estimate is an average discounted value that also takes the cost of development into account, while our marginal value doesn't include the cost of development. However, regarding the fact that the marginal value in this model includes all the effective projects (which can fail in further phases) in the R&D process, and the those projects take at least 10 years to be introduced as a new drug, marginal value of 25.3 million seems to lie reasonably in line, compared to the mean of NPV of a new drug introduction in Grabowski and Vernon (1994) .
Conclusion
In this study we estimate the impact of a technology buyer's in-house R&D on its bargaining power in the technology licensing market, focusing on the pharmaceutical industry. We develop a model in which we allow a buyer's in-house R&D investment to affect the price of an external technology, given the competition among the technology suppliers and buyers, and in light of bargaining consideration.
Our estimates suggest that increases of a technology buyer's in-house R&D decreases the price of a license. However, this impact of in-house R&D on the technology-buyer bargaining power seems relatively small. Also, the number of external technology suppliers reduces in-house R&D, but increases the overall level of innovative activity. Rather, a substantial reduction of technology suppliers has a negative impact on the number of drugs in the market.
The argument in this paper implicates a subtle point about a firm's in-house R&D. A firm's inhouse R&D plays three different, but inter-related roles: it generates innovation and knowledge, it enhances the ability to exploit and evaluate external resources (absorptive capacity), and it affects the price of technology by increasing bargaining power. The third point is, indeed, the evidence which confirms the anecdotal notion of firms bargaining over the licensing contract with their in-house R&D efforts. However, as we briefly mentioned in the estimation results, the bargaining power effect is not identified separately from the absorptive capacity. Therefore, the estimation result we presented above can be thought as a sum of the bargaining power effect and the absorptive capacity effect. In any case, a firm that tries to replace R&D investment with licensing may encounter problems utilizing the technology and may have to pay more for licenses they need (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001 ).
In further work, it would be desirable to separate the bargaining power and absorptive capacity explicitly from our result . Also the dynamic properties of markets for technologies need further investigation.
[Appendix 1] R&D in the pharmaceutical industry
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most R&D intensive industries. (Arora, Fosfuri, Gambardella, 2001 ). In the pharmaceutical industry, relatively strong Intellectual Property Rights protection as well as 'the biotechnology revolution' facilitated the advance of markets for technologies (Arora and Gambardella, 1990 ).
Because of the structure of the approval process for new drugs in the US, there is a good measure of the progress of drug projects' R&D courses: the "phase" of the approval process. These four While all projects go through the above process, CDER (Center for Drug Evaluation Research)
can impose a clinical hold (i.e., prohibit the study from proceeding or stop a trial that has started) for reasons of safety, or because of a sponsor's failure to accurately disclose the risk of study to investigators, or if the protocol is clearly deficient in design in meeting its stated objectives (http://www.fda.gov/cder/). Government approval determines whether the project can go to further development phases.
